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Optimal Real-Time Bidding Strategies∗
Joaquin Fernandez-Tapia†, Olivier Guéant‡, Jean-Michel Lasry§
Abstract
The ad-trading desks of media-buying agencies are increasingly relying on com-
plex algorithms for purchasing advertising inventory. In particular, Real-Time Bidding
(RTB) algorithms respond to many auctions – usually Vickrey auctions – throughout
the day for buying ad-inventory with the aim of maximizing one or several key per-
formance indicators (KPI). The optimization problems faced by companies building
bidding strategies are new and interesting for the community of applied mathemati-
cians. In this article, we introduce a stochastic optimal control model that addresses
the question of the optimal bidding strategy in various realistic contexts: the maximiza-
tion of the inventory bought with a given amount of cash in the framework of audience
strategies, the maximization of the number of conversions/acquisitions with a given
amount of cash, etc. In our model, the sequence of auctions is modeled by a Poisson
process and the price to beat for each auction is modeled by a random variable following
almost any probability distribution. We show that the optimal bids are characterized
by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, and that almost-closed-form solutions can be
found by using a fluid limit. Numerical examples are also provided.
Keywords: Real-Time Bidding, Vickrey auctions, Stochastic optimal control, Convex
analysis, Fluid limit approximation.
1 Introduction
From the viewpoint of a company launching an advertising campaign, the goal of digital
advertising is to increase its return on investment by leveraging the different channels en-
abling an interaction with its potential customers: desktop display, mobile, social media,
e-mailing, etc. Usually, this is achieved via branding campaigns, by prospecting individuals
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who are likely to be in affinity with a given product/campaign, or by driving those who
have already shown some interest into a final conversion (e.g. a purchase).
In recent years, the advertising industry has gone through a lot of upheavals: numerous
technological changes, a deluge of newly available data, the emergence of a huge number
of ad-tech startups entering the market, etc. In particular, new mechanisms have emerged
and have completely changed the way digital ad inventory is purchased. In practice, the
inventory is often purchased programmatically, and it is possible to algorithmically buy
it unit by unit, with the hope of making real the original promise of the advertising and
media buying industry: targeting the right person, at the right time, and in the right context.
Programmatic media buying has skyrocketed over the last five years. Although these fig-
ures can only be rough approximations, it is estimated that the total net advertising revenue
linked to programmatic desktop display in Europe was around e 2.9bn in 2014. For program-
matic mobile display and video display the figures were respectively e 552m and e 205m
– see [15]. Overall, the total growth in net advertising revenue related to programmatic
media buying was around 70% in Europe between 2013 and 2014. IAB Europe estimates in
[15] that the percentage of revenue coming from programmatic media buying is a two-digit
number for all formats: 39% for desktop display, 27% for mobile display, and 12% for video
display. In the US, the figures are even more staggering with $5.89bn spent programmat-
ically on desktop/laptop display, and $4.44bn on mobile/tablet display, in 2014 (source:
eMarketer.com).
One of the main and most exciting developments in programmatic media buying is Real-
Time Bidding (or RTB). RTB is a new paradigm in the way digital inventory is purchased:
advertisers1 can buy online inventory through real-time auctions for displaying a banner (or
a short video). These real-time auctions make it possible for advertisers to target individual
users on a per-access basis.
In a nutshell, each time a user visits a website, the publisher – the supply side – connects
to a virtual marketplace, called an ad exchange, in order to trigger an auction for each
available slot that can be allocated to advertising. On the demand side, ad trading desks
receive auction requests (sometimes through a Demand-Side Platform – DSP), together
with information about the user, the type of website, etc., and choose the bid level that
best suits their strategy. Once the different bids are processed, the slot is attributed to the
bidder who has proposed the highest bid and the price paid depends on the type of auction.
The entire process, from the user entering the website to the display of the banner, takes
around 100 milliseconds.
RTB auctions are usually of the Vickrey type, also known as “second-price auctions”. In
short, the mechanism is the following: first, the participants send their bids in a sealed way,
1Mostly through intermediaries such as media agencies, but sometimes also by themselves when they set
up trading desks.
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then, the item (here the slot) is sold to the participant who has proposed the highest bid,
and the price paid by this participant corresponds to the second best bid (or to a minimum
price if there is only one participant). Structurally, Vickrey auctions give participants an
incentive to reveal their true valuation for the item – see [23].
The problem faced by ad-trading desks is to choose the optimal bid level each time they
receive a request to participate in a Vickrey auction. Here, optimality may have differ-
ent meanings, depending on the considered key performance indicator (KPI). In all cases,
the complexity of the problem arises from the need of optimizing a functional depending
on macroscopic quantities at an hourly, daily or weekly timescale, by interacting with the
system at the microscopic scale of each auction, i.e. through a high-frequency/low-latency
bidding algorithm participating in thousands of auctions per second. This multi-scale fea-
ture leads to the need of mathematical models that are both realistic and tractable, because
numerical methods are often cumbersome and time-consuming in the case of multi-scale
problems. In this article, we rely on methods coming from stochastic optimal control and
we show that the optimal bidding strategy can be approximated very precisely (and almost
in closed form) by using classical tools of convex optimization.
Besides the classical literature on Vickrey auctions (see for instance [7, 17, 23]) – which is
related to auction theory and more generally to game theory –, the academic literature on
this new kind of problems is really scarce. General approaches for Real-Time Bidding opti-
mization from a buyer’s perspective can be found mostly in conference proceedings from the
computer-science community (e.g. [21, 26]). Our approach is similar to the one presented
in the work of Amin et al. [1]: both are Markov Decision Process (MDP) approaches2
and dealing with similar auction problems. However, besides the originality of their model,
Amin et al. do not extend their mathematical development beyond the baseline discrete
case. Another author introduced an MDP approach in the conference paper [25], but he
focused on the problem from a publisher perspective. In general, the supply-side perspective
has generated more academic research than the demand-side one (see Yuan’s PhD disserta-
tion [24] and the articles by Balseiro et al. [3, 4]). A recent study of RTB auctions from a
buyer’s perspective is Stavrogianni’s PhD dissertation [22].
Our stochastic optimal control approach is inspired by the academic literature in algorithmic
trading [2, 13, 14], where, similarly to our problem, the goal is to optimize a macroscopic
functional depending on the terminal state of the algorithm (e.g. at the end of the day)
by continuously making decisions on a high-frequency basis (i.e. milliseconds). Moreover,
like in high-frequency trading models involving limit orders, the algorithm should react to
a system driven by one or several controlled Poisson processes.
In this paper – the first of a series on Real-Time Bidding, see [11] and [12] –, we model by
a marked Poisson process the sequence of auction requests received by an ad-trading desk:
the Poisson process models the arrival times of the requests, and the marks correspond
2Even though ours is in continuous time.
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to independent random variables (pn)n∈N∗ modeling the price to beat, i.e. the highest bid
proposed by the other participants’ in the auction.3 Every time an auction is received, the
algorithm sends a bid b to the auction server. For the nth auction, the inventory is purchased
by the algorithm if and only if the bid sent by the algorithm is greater than the price to
beat pn (and in that case the price paid for the slot is pn). The rationale for considering
this statistical model, rather than a more complicated game-theoretical one, comes from:
(i) the large number of auction requests (several hundreds per second) for most segments
of audience, and (ii) our assumption that the algorithm is restricted to an homogeneous
subset of the inventory (i.e. we assume that a segmentation of the different audiences and
contexts has been carried out beforehand, or, in other words, that the problem we consider
is at the tactical “execution” level – see also [9, 10]).
In Section 2, we introduce the main notations of our modeling framework, and we focus
on a stochastic optimal control problem where an ad trader aims at maximizing the total
number of banners displayed, for a given spending (audience strategy). We exhibit the char-
acterization of the optimal bidding strategy with a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, and
show that the optimal bidding strategy can be obtained in almost-closed form by using a
fluid-limit approximation. Moreover, this approximation leads to a new characterization of
the bidding strategy in the form of an optimal scheduling, which in practice can be tracked
by a feedback-control mechanism. The main result is indeed that the budget should be
spent evenly over the considered time window.
In Section 3, we propose several extensions of our model. In particular, we generalize the
initial model by considering several sources and types of inventory, and we consider another
objective function for taking account of a very important KPI: the number of conversions.
In these extensions, as in the initial model with only one source of inventory, we find that
the total budget should be spent evenly over the considered time window – see [12] for a
different conclusion when on-line learning is considered. However, we find that the optimal
bidding strategies are not uniform across sources, but instead proportional to an index which
is, in the general case with multiple sources and conversions, a simple function of (i) the a
priori interest for each source/type of inventory, (ii) the a priori interest for each source of
conversion, and (iii) the probability of conversion associated to each source. In Section 3,
we also discuss the difference between first-price and second-price auctions, the impact of
floor prices, and more general – nonlinear – objective criterions.
3In particular, by assuming that the best price of other participants is an exogenous variable, we ignore all
game-theoretical effects, or, equivalently, all strategic interactions between market participants. Although
we do not consider these aspects in the present paper, it would be very interesting to consider several
agents – or continuums of agents in a mean field game setup – with different goals and to look for the Nash
equilibriums in the repeated auction game at the heart of our model. This would be particularly relevant
for auctions on small and specific parts of the audience.
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2 A model for audience strategies
In this section, we present a model where an ad trader wishes to spend a given amount of
money S¯ over a time window [0, T ], in order to display a maximum number of banners to a
given population. He receives auction requests at random times from a single ad exchange
– and does not know in advance how many auction requests he will receive. The model we
propose is naturally written in continuous time and the (random) occurrences of auction
requests are modeled by the jumps of a Poisson process. A simplified discrete-time model-
ing framework is presented in the appendix for readers who are more used to discrete-time
Markov decision processes.
2.1 The modeling framework in continuous time
Let us fix a probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with a filtration (Ft)t∈R+ satisfying the
usual conditions. We assume that all stochastic processes are defined on (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈R+ ,P).
Auctions:
We consider an ad trader connected to an ad exchange.4 He receives requests to partici-
pate in auctions in order to purchase inventory and display some banners to the specific
population he wants to target. Requests are modeled with a marked Poisson process: the
arrival of requests is triggered by the jumps of a Poisson process (Nt)t with intensity λ > 0,
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and the marks (pn)n∈N∗ correspond, for each auction, to the highest bid among the other
participants’ bids.
Every time he receives a request to participate in an auction, the ad trader can bid a price:
at time t, if he receives a request, then we denote his bid by bt. We assume that the ad
trader stands ready to bid (possibly a bid equal to 0 or +∞) at all times. In particular, we
assume that (bt)t is a predictable process with values in R+ ∪ {+∞}.
If at time t the nth auction occurs, the outcome of this auction is the following:
• If bt > pn, then the ad trader wins the auction: he pays the price pn and his banner
is displayed.
• If bt ≤ pn, then
6 the ad trader does not win the auction. In particular, the trader’s
banner is not displayed and he pays nothing.
4The ad trader may be connected to several ad exchanges, but we assume in this first model that he does
not make any difference between auction requests coming from the different ad exchanges.
5In this paper, we only consider the case of a constant intensity λ. A time-varying auction-request
intensity can be handled via a change of time, similar as in [10], where the main idea is to switch from
physical time to trading time.
6The equality case is not considered separately because we assume that the distribution of the variables
(pn)n is absolutely continuous – see below.
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An important assumption of our model is that (pn)n∈N∗ are i.i.d. random variables dis-
tributed according to an absolutely continuous distribution. We denote by F the associated
cumulative distribution function and by f the associated probability density function. Our
assumptions are the following:
• ∀n ∈ N∗, pn is almost surely positive. In particular, F (0) = 0.
• ∀p > 0, f(p) > 0.7
• limp→+∞ p
3f(p) = 0.
Remaining cash process:
We denote by (St)t the process modeling the amount of cash to be spent. Its dynamics is:
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dSt = −pNt1{bt>pNt}dNt, S0 = S¯. (2.1)
Inventory process:
The number of impressions, i.e. the number of banners displayed, is modeled by the inven-
tory process (It)t. Its dynamics is:
dIt = 1{bt>pNt}dNt, I0 = 0.
Stochastic optimal control problem:
In the model of this section, the trader aims at maximizing the expected number of banners
displayed over [0, T ]. We should impose not to spend more than S¯, but, for technical reasons,
we do prefer to consider a relaxed problem, and to penalize extra-spending. We consider
therefore the maximization of the following criterion:
E
[
IT −Kmin (ST , 0)
2
]
,
where K measures the importance of the penalty for extra-spending.9
For mathematical reasons, we do prefer to write the stochastic optimal control problem as
a minimization problem:
inf
(bt)t∈A
E
[
−IT +Kmin (ST , 0)
2
]
,
where A is the set of predictable processes with values in R+ ∪ {+∞}.
7The model can easily be (slightly) modified to cover the case of truncated functions f , i.e. f equal to
0 above a given price level.
8This process is well defined because ∀n ∈ N∗, pn ∈ L1(Ω).
9In particular, we will consider the limit case K → +∞ as a way to see what happens when the maximal
total amount to spend is imposed.
6
Value function:
To tackle this stochastic optimal control model, we introduce the value function
u : (t, I, S) ∈ [0, T ]× N× (−∞, S¯] 7→ inf
(bs)s≥t∈At
E
[
−Ib,t,IT +Kmin
(
S
b,t,S
T , 0
)2]
,
where At is the set of predictable processes on [t, T ] with values in R+ ∪ {+∞}, and
dSb,t,Ss = −pNs1{bs>pNs}dNs, S
b,t,S
t = S,
dIb,t,Is = 1{bs>pNs}dNs, I
b,t,I
t = I.
2.2 Solution of the stochastic optimal control problem
2.2.1 A characterization with a non-standard HJB equation
To solve the above stochastic optimal control problem, we introduce the associated Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation which corresponds to the continuous-time equivalent of the
Bellman equation (A.2) derived in discrete time from the dynamic programming principle
– see the appendix. Here the HJB equation is:10
− ∂tu(t, I, S)− λ inf
b∈R+
∫ b
0
f(p)(u(t, I + 1, S − p)− u(t, I, S))dp = 0, (2.2)
with terminal condition u(T, I, S) = −I +Kmin (S, 0)2.
Eq. (2.2) is a non-standard integro-differential HJB equation – which is similar to Eq. (A.2).
Because the objective function is affine in the variable I, the dimensionality of the problem
can be reduced by considering the ansatz u(t, I, S) = −I + v(t, S).
With this ansatz, Eq. (2.2) becomes indeed:
− ∂tv(t, S)− λ inf
b∈R+
∫ b
0
f(p)(v(t, S − p)− v(t, S) − 1)dp = 0, (2.3)
with terminal condition v(T, S) = Kmin (S, 0)2.11
10For not making this paper a too technical one, we focus on applications and not on the mathematical
analysis of the integro-differential Bellman equations we derive. The interested reader can derive existence
and uniqueness results by using for instance the advanced viscosity techniques presented in [5]. It is note-
worthy that we are going to approximate the problem by its fluid limit for which the classical approach with
weak semi-concave solutions applies – see [6, 8].
11Equivalently, Eq. (2.3) can be written
−∂tv(t, S) − λ inf
b∈R+
(
−F (b) +
∫ b
0
f(p)(v(t, S − p)− v(t, S))dp
)
= 0.
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Eq. (2.3) is another non-standard integro-differential Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman, but with
only one spatial dimension instead of two. It is straightforward to verify that it corresponds
to the following stochastic optimal control problem:
inf
(bt)t∈A
E
[
−λ
∫ T
0
F (bt)dt+Kmin (ST , 0)
2
]
, (2.4)
where A is the set of predictable processes with values in R+ ∪ {+∞}.
The change of variables u(t, I, S) = −I + v(t, S) is key to reduce the dimensionality of the
problem. For understanding the underlying rationale, let us notice that −u(t, I, S) is (up to
the penalization term) the number of impressions an ad trader should expect to purchase
over the time interval [0, T ], if, at time t, he has already purchased a number of impressions
equal to I, and has an amount S to be spent optimally over [t, T ]. Because the number of
impressions that will be purchased over [t, T ] does not depend on the number of impressions
already purchased, except through the budget that has been spent – or, equivalently, that
remains to be spent –, the quantity −u(t, I, S) − I should be independent of I. Hence
the ansatz u(t, I, S) = −I + v(t, S). In particular, the quantity −v(t, S) represents (up to
the penalization term) the number of impressions an ad trader should expect to purchase
over the time interval [t, T ], if he has, at time t, an amount S to be spent optimally over [t, T ].
2.2.2 The reasons why we need to go beyond Eq. (2.3)
From the previous paragraphs, one could consider that the problem is almost entirely solved.
Because Eq. (2.3) characterizes the optimal bidding strategy, finding the optimal bid in each
state (t, S) of the system simply boils down indeed to implementing a backward (monotone)
numerical scheme to approximate the solution of Eq. (2.3).
However, it is noteworthy that the problem faced by the ad trader is a two-scale one:
• The macroscopic scale is the tactical scale.12 This scale is related to the time horizon T
and to the amount of cash S¯ the ad trader has to spend over the time interval [0, T ].
In practice, for intraday tactics, the order of magnitude is in the range 102 − 104 s
(seconds) for T , and in the range e 101 − 104 for S¯.
• The microscopic scale is the scale of each auction, related to the intensity λ, and to
the variables b and p (in the integral term of Eq. (2.3)). The order of magnitude for
these variables is around 103 s−1 for λ, and in the range e 10−5− 10−2 for each bid.13
If one wants to approximate the solution of Eq. (2.3) on a grid in (t, S), the time step
∆t and the cash/spatial step ∆S should be compatible with the microscopic scale. To take
12This scale may instead be regarded as mesoscopic, if we consider that the advertising campaign consti-
tutes the macroscopic scale.
13These values may seem quite small at first reading. We remind the reader that the industry standard
is to measure bid levels and prices for bulks of one thousand impressions (CPM, or cost-per-mille). For
instance, if for a given auction a practitioner talks about a bid of e 1, then in reality that is e 10−3.
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account of the fast arrival of auction requests, a natural time step is ∆t around 10−4 second.
As far as the cash to spend is concerned, if one wants to be precise when computing the
optimal bid for each auction, a natural value for ∆S is around e 10−7, given the previously
discussed orders of magnitude for the bids. Given the orders of magnitude considered at the
macroscopic scale, we need to consider a numerical scheme on a grid with 106 − 108 points
in time and 108 − 1011 points in space, which is computationally extremely costly.14 Even
though smart numerical methods can be built to avoid computations at each point of the
grid, the multi-scale nature of the problem is an important issue in practice.15
A way to avoid using a computer-intensive numerical method is to look for almost-closed-
form approximations. As we will show below, such an approximation can be found by using
a first-order Taylor expansion in the integral term of Eq. (2.3).
2.3 Almost-closed-form approximation of the solution
In this subsection, we aim at approximating the value function v and the resulting optimal
control function (t, S) 7→ b∗(t, S) corresponding to the optimal bidding strategy – the latter
is characterized either by
v(t, St− − b
∗(t, St−)) = v(t, St−) + 1, (2.5)
if this equation has a solution, or by b∗(t, St−) = +∞ otherwise, i.e. if we are in the case
where limS→−∞ v(t, S) ≤ v(t, St−) + 1.
The main idea underlying the approximation we obtain in the following paragraphs is to re-
place the term v(t, S−p)−v(t, S) in Eq. (2.3) by its first-order Taylor expansion−p∂Sv(t, S).
We therefore replace Eq. (2.3) by:
− ∂tv(t, S)− λ inf
b∈R+
−
∫ b
0
f(p) (1 + p∂Sv(t, S)) dp = 0. (2.6)
with terminal condition v(T, S) = Kmin (S, 0)2.
Intuitively, this approximation is relevant because of the multi-scale nature of the problem:
the range of values for b should be several orders of magnitude smaller than the values taken
by S.16
2.3.1 A fluid-limit approximation
In the following paragraphs, we show that Eq. (2.6) is the Hamilton-Jacobi equation asso-
ciated with a variational problem which can be regarded as the fluid limit of the stochastic
14It is not an issue that the numerical solution of Eq. (2.3) takes far more time (seconds, minutes, ...)
to be computed than the maximal time authorized to send a bid to the auction servers (milliseconds). In
practice, the solution can be computed in advance, and then be embedded in an in-memory look-up table
allowing low-latency requests.
15This problem is even more critical in the case of the on-line estimation of the parameters – see [12].
16This point will be discussed below.
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optimal control problem we considered in the previous subsection.
For that purpose, let us introduce the following optimization problem:
inf
(b˜t)t∈Adet
−λ
∫ T
0
F (b˜t)dt+Kmin
(
S˜ b˜T , 0
)2
,
where
dS˜ b˜t = −λG(b˜t)dt, G : x ∈ R+ ∪ {+∞} 7→
∫ x
0
pf(p)dp,
and where Adet is the set of F0-measurable processes with values in R+ ∪ {+∞}.
The value function v˜ associated with this problem is defined as:
v˜(t, S) = inf
(b˜s)s≥t∈Adet
−λ
∫ T
t
F (b˜s)ds+Kmin
(
S˜
b˜,t,S
T , 0
)2
,
where
dS˜ b˜,t,Ss = −λG(b˜s)ds, S˜
b˜,t,S
t = S.
We have the following Theorem:
Theorem 2.1. Let us define
H(x) = λ sup
b∈R+
∫ b
0
f(p) (1 + xp) dp.
=
{
−λx
∫ − 1
x
0 F (p)dp, x < 0
λ
(
1 + x
∫∞
0 pf(p)dp
)
, x ≥ 0.
The value function v˜ is given by:
v˜(t, S) = sup
x≤0
(
Sx− (T − t)H(x)−
x2
4K
)
.
It is the unique weak semi-concave solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (2.6).
Furthermore, the optimal control function (t, S) 7→ b˜∗(t, S) is given by the following:
• If S ≥ λ(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf(p)dp, then b˜
∗(t, S) = +∞.
• If S < λ(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf(p)dp, then b˜
∗(t, S) = − 1
x∗
, where x∗ is characterized by
S = (T − t)H ′(x∗) +
x∗
2K
. (2.7)
Proof.
By using the change of variables as = λG(b˜s) ∈ I = [0, λ
∫∞
0 pf(p)dp], we have:
v˜(t, S) = inf
(as)s≥t∈A
′
det
∫ T
t
L (as) ds+Kmin
(
Ŝ
a,t,S
T , 0
)2
, (2.8)
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where A′
det
is the set of F0-measurable processes with values in I , where
dŜa,t,Ss = −asds, Ŝ
a,t,S
t = S,
and where the function L is defined by:
L : a ∈ I 7→ −λF
(
G−1
(a
λ
))
.
L is continuously differentiable on the interior of I , with:
L′(a) =
(
G−1
)′ (a
λ
)
F ′
(
G−1
(a
λ
))
= −
f
(
G−1
(
a
λ
))
G′
(
G−1
(
a
λ
))
= −
1
G−1
(
a
λ
) .
In particular, since G is an increasing function, L′ is increasing, and, therefore, L is strictly
convex.
Let us now compute the Legendre-Fenchel transform of L:
L∗(x) = sup
a∈I
xa− L(a)
= sup
b∈R+
λxG(b) + λF (b)
= λ sup
b∈R+
∫ b
0
(1 + xp)f(p)dp (2.9)
= H(x).
If x < 0, then the first order condition associated with the supremum in Eq. (2.9) is
f(b∗) (1 + b∗x) = 0. In other words:
x < 0⇒ b∗ = −
1
x
.
If x is nonnegative, then b∗ = +∞.
In the former case, we can write (by using an integration by parts):
H(x) = λ sup
b∈R+
∫ b
0
(1 + xp) f(p)dp
= λ
∫ b∗
0
f(p) (1 + xp) dp
= −λx
∫ − 1
x
0
F (p)dp.
11
The Legendre-Fenchel transform of L is therefore H, which can indeed be written as:
H(x) =
{
−λx
∫ − 1
x
0 F (p)dp, x < 0
λ
(
1 + x
∫∞
0 pf(p)dp
)
, x ≥ 0.
It is straightforward to check that H is a twice continuously differentiable convex function.17
We know, from classical variational calculus, that v˜ is given by the Hopf-Lax formula:
v˜(t, S) = inf
y∈[S−λ
∫∞
0
pf(p)dp(T−t),S]
(
(T − t)L
(
S − y
T − t
)
+Kmin(y, 0)2
)
. (2.10)
By using an infimal convolution, we can transform Eq. (2.10) into:
v˜(t, S) = sup
x
(
Sx− (T − t)H(x)− sup
y
(
yx−Kmin(y, 0)2
))
= sup
x
(
Sx− (T − t)H(x)− χR−(x)−
x2
4K
)
= sup
x≤0
(
Sx− (T − t)H(x)−
x2
4K
)
. (2.11)
This is the first result of the Theorem.
Furthermore, we know that it is the unique weak semi-concave solution of the following
Hamilton-Jacobi equation:
−∂tv˜(t, S) +H(∂S v˜(t, S)) = 0,
with terminal condition v˜(T, S) = Kmin(S, 0)2.
This equation is exactly the same as Eq. (2.6), hence the second assertion of the Theorem.
Moreover the optimal control in the modified problem (2.8) is given by
a∗(t, S) = H ′(∂S v˜(t, S)).
17Straightforward computations give:
H
′(x) =
{
λ
∫ − 1
x
0
pf(p)dp = λG
(
− 1
x
)
, x < 0
λ
∫∞
0
pf(p)dp, x ≥ 0.
In particular, H ′(0) = λ
∫∞
0
pf(p)dp.
Because limp→+∞ p3f(p) = 0, the function H ′ is continuously differentiable with:
H
′′(x) =
{
−λ 1
x3
f
(
− 1
x
)
, x < 0
0, x ≥ 0.
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Therefore, the optimal control function in the initial problem is:
b˜∗(t, S) =
{
− 1
∂S v˜(t,S)
, ∂S v˜(t, S) < 0
+∞, ∂S v˜(t, S) ≥ 0.
If S ≥ (T − t)H ′(0) = λ(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf(p)dp, then the supremum in Eq. (2.11) is reached at
x∗ = 0. Therefore, ∂S v˜(t, S) = 0 and b˜
∗(t, S) = +∞.
Otherwise, the supremum in Eq. (2.11) is reached at x∗ ≤ 0 uniquely characterized by:
S = (T − t)H ′(x∗) +
x∗
2K
.
In particular, ∂S v˜(t, S) = x
∗ and b˜∗(t, S) = − 1
x∗
where x∗ is characterized by Eq. (2.7).
2.3.2 The approximation of the optimal bidding strategy and its interpretation
Theorem 2.1 invites to use v˜ as an approximation for v. Then the optimal bidding strategy
(b∗t )t can be approximated either by b˜
∗(t, St−), or by solving Eq. (2.5) in which v is replaced
by v˜. In what follows, we consider the former approach. Furthermore, we consider the
limit case where K → +∞. Subsequently, we approximate the optimal bid b∗t at time t by
b˜∗∞(t, St−), where the function b˜
∗
∞ is defined by:
• If S ≥ λ(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf(p)dp, then b˜
∗
∞(t, S) = +∞.
• If S < λ(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf(p)dp, then b˜
∗
∞(t, S) is given by:
b˜∗∞(t, S) = −
1
H ′−1
(
S
T−t
) .
In order to understand the above results, it is worth recalling that
∫∞
0 pf(p)dp is the average
price to beat, and λ(T − t) is the expected number of auctions the ad trader will partici-
pate in between the time t and the terminal time T . Therefore, λ(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf(p)dp is the
expected amount of cash the ad trader will spend if he bids an infinite price in order to win
all the auctions for which he receives a request. It is therefore natural, in our risk-neutral
setting, to bid b˜∗∞(t, St−) = +∞ at time t if the remaining amount to spend St− is greater
than λ(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf(p)dp.
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If St− < λ(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf(p)dp, then the approximation b˜
∗
∞(t, St−) of the optimal bid b
∗
t
verifies:
18Considering very large values of b may seem to go against the fluid-limit approximation. However, this
is not really the case because the price eventually paid for each auction won remains really small compared
to the budget S, except perhaps near the terminal time T .
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λ(T − t)
∫ b˜∗∞(t,St−)
0
pf(p)dp = St−.
To understand this bidding strategy, let us consider the situation from time t, in the inter-
esting case, i.e. when St− < λ(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf(p)dp. If we use the above approximation of the
optimal bidding strategy, the dynamics of the remaining cash is (for 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T ):
dSs = −pNs1{b˜∗∞(s,Ss−)>pNs}
dNs, St = S.
Therefore:
dE[Ss] = −E
[
λ
∫ b˜∗∞(s,Ss−)
0
pf(p)dp
]
ds = −
E[Ss]
T − s
ds.
This gives E[Ss] = S
T−s
T−t . In other words, the approximation of the optimal bidding strategy
is such that, on average, the remaining cash is spent evenly across [t, T ].19
One of the main consequences of the previous analysis is that optimality is not only charac-
terized by the optimal bid, but also by the speed at which the budget is spent. The latter
is very helpful in terms of implementation. Indeed, defining the solution by an optimal
scheduling curve (also known as budget-pacing, see [10]) makes it possible to dynamically
control the bid by a feedback-control system tracking a target curve which does not depend
on the form of the function f . With this point of view, the exact knowledge of the optimal
bidding function is no more necessary. However, this analysis is based on the fluid-limit
approximation. Subsequently, it is valid as far as the number of auction requests is large
enough. For audience strategies focusing on small subsets of the inventory (e.g. targeting
only a few customers, restricting the strategy to premium inventory only, purchasing slots
for a very specific banner format, etc.), a numerical approximation of the solution of the
initial stochastic control problem is needed.20
2.4 Numerical examples
We present a numerical example for an algorithm spending e 1 during a period of 100
seconds. Due to the high-frequency nature of the algorithm, considering a larger time frame
and a larger budget does not make an important difference from a mathematical standpoint.
Notice that the spending rate (∼ e 500/day) – even though it may seem small given the
sizes of overall advertizing budgets – is realistic in the light of our problem: we are focusing
on an algorithm which is already restricted to a particular channel, audience, and subset of
inventory. In practice, ad trading desks dynamically allocate the overall budget throughout
the day across a large array of algorithms, such as the one presented here.21
19In the case of a time-varying arrival rate of auction requests λt, a similar variational problem, solved
in [10], shows that the optimal strategy is to spend proportionally to λt.
20In that case, the size of the grid can be reduced, because λ is small.
21The optimal allocation of the overall budget across several bidding algorithms goes beyond the scope
of this work. However, we can see the extensions of Section 3 as a way of addressing this issue. A natural
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2.4.1 Numerical approximations of v and b∗
For our numerical experiments, we assume that the distribution of the price to beat is an
exponential distribution22 with parameter µ, i.e. f(p) = µe−µp. We chose µ = 2 · 103 e −1,
which is consistent with a CPM of the order of e 0.5.
We represent in Figure 1 a numerical approximation of the solution v of the HJB equa-
tion (2.3).23 As stated above, the quantity −v(t, S) can be interpreted (up to the penalty
term) as the expected number of impressions that will be purchased from time t by an
algorithm following the optimal strategy, when the remaining budget at time t is S.
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Figure 1: Solution of the HJB equation (2.3). λ = 500 s−1, T = 100 s and S¯ = e 1 .
When solving the HJB equation (2.3), the most important quantity to compute is the op-
timal control, i.e. the optimal bid function (t, S) 7→ b∗(t, S). This function is plotted in
Figure 2. Because the values of the optimal bid increase abruptly as t → T , we prefer to
plot the logarithm in basis 10 of b∗(t, S).
The optimal bids plotted in Figure 2 are consistent with intuition: the higher the remaining
budget and the closer to the terminal time, the higher the optimal bid.
alternative is to use multi-armed bandit algorithms such as those proposed in [18, 19, 20].
22A Pareto distribution or an extreme-value distribution are also relevant choices.
23For approximating numerically the solution v of the HJB equation (2.3), we consider a backward-in-time
explicit scheme on a (t, S) grid. The minimizer b∗ at each point of the grid is found by using the first order
condition (2.5) (and an affine approximation between successive points). The integral is then approximated
by a closed form formula by using an affine approximation of v between successive points of the grid and
the exponential form of f .
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Figure 2: log10(b
∗(t, S)) (the unit of b∗ is one thousandth of a euro). λ = 500 s−1, T = 100 s
and S¯ = e 1 .
2.4.2 Simulations
One of the consequences of the fluid-limit approximation is that the average spending rate
should be constant. An important question is whether or not this feature is also true
when one uses the optimal bidding strategy obtained numerically by solving the HJB equa-
tion (2.3). To answer this question, we carried out simulations by drawing the times at
which auction requests occur and the values of the price to beat for each auction (using the
same set of parameters as above).
Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the result for different time windows (we zoom in from 100 s, to
10 s, to 1 s): the remaining-cash process is plotted in the left panels and the number of
impressions is plotted in the right panels. For the (realistic) values of the parameters we
considered, it is clear that the budget is spent linearly.
We also carried out simulations for a smaller value of λ (λ = 2 s−1) – i.e. in a less liquid
market, with a smaller number of auction requests – in order to test the robustness of the
qualitative result obtained with the fluid-limit approximation. In Figure 6, we plot the
solution v to the HJB equation (2.3) and the associated optimal bids (in log). In Figure 7,
we plot the outcome of the simulations corresponding to the new values of the parameters.
As above, we see that spending rate fluctuates but remains around a constant corresponding
to even spending over the trading period.
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Figure 3: Remaining cash process (left) and inventory process (right) for the optimal bidding
strategy computed numerically, over a time window of 100 seconds.
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Figure 4: Remaining cash process (left) and inventory process (right) for the optimal bidding
strategy computed numerically – zoom over 10 seconds.
62.0 62.2 62.4 62.6 62.8 63.0
time
0.394
0.396
0.398
0.400
0.402
0.404
re
m
a
in
in
g
 c
a
sh
62.0 62.2 62.4 62.6 62.8 63.0
time
8180
8200
8220
8240
8260
8280
8300
in
v
e
n
to
ry
Figure 5: Remaining cash process (left) and inventory process (right) for the optimal bidding
strategy computed numerically – zoom over 1 second.
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Figure 6: Solution of the HJB equation (2.3) (left panel) and optimal bid log10(b
∗(t, S))
(right panel). λ = 2 s−1, T = 1000 s and S¯ = e 1.
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Figure 7: Remaining cash process (left) and inventory process (right) for the optimal bidding
strategy computed numerically. λ = 2 s−1, T = 1000 s and S¯ = e 1.
3 Extensions and discussion about the model
In this section, we present two important extensions of the model introduced in Section 2.
The first one is a multi-source extension: we consider the case where auction requests arise
from several ad exchanges (or from the same ad exchange but from different types of au-
dience), with different frequencies, and different laws for the price to beat. The second
extension is related to conversions: in addition to the number of impressions they buy, ad
trading desks often consider the number of conversions as a KPI, which is more in line
with the return-on-investment goals of the brand or company launching the advertising
campaign. For both extensions, we show that the problem remains in dimension 2 (after
a change of variables), even though the dimension of the state space increases proportion-
ally with the number of sources and almost doubles when conversions are taken into account.
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In addition to these two extensions, we discuss many features of the model. In particular,
the difference between Vickrey auctions and first-price auctions is addressed, along with the
existence of floor prices of several kinds. KPIs are finally discussed because the dimension-
ality reduction at work in the model of Section 2 and in the two extensions presented below
is associated with the linearity of the objective function (up to the penalty term).
3.1 Introducing heterogeneity in auctions requests
The first extension we consider focuses on the situation where the inventory can be purchased
from different sources, i.e. different ad exchanges, or simply different types of audience. The
heterogeneity comes from differences in the frequency of arrival of auction requests, in the
distribution of the price to beat associated with each source, or in the relative importance
given to each type of inventory in the objective function. An important situation is when
the inventory is homogeneous across different ad exchanges and the differences only lie in
the statistical properties of the auctions. In that case, we show – in the fluid-limit case –
that the optimal bid are the same across venues, which is consistent with the result obtained
in [9]. However, when audiences are heterogenous, we show that the optimal bids differ from
one source to the next as a function of the relative importance given to the different types
of audience in the objective function.
3.1.1 Setup of the model
In what follows, we still consider an ad trader who wishes to spend a given amount of
money S¯ over a time window [0, T ].
Auctions:
This ad trader is connected to J > 1 sources from which he receives requests to partici-
pate in auctions in order to purchase inventory – we assume that the trader knows from
which source each auction request arises. Requests are modeled with J marked Poisson
processes: the arrival of requests from the source j ∈ {1, . . . , J} is triggered by the jumps
of the Poisson process (N jt )t with intensity λ
j > 0, and the marks (pjn)n∈N∗ correspond, for
each auction request sent by the source j, to the highest bid sent by the other participants.24
Every time he receives from the source j a request to participate in an auction, the ad trader
can bid a price: at time t, if he receives a request from the source j, then we denote his bid
by bjt . As in the model with only one source, we assume that the ad trader stands ready to
bid (possibly a bid equal to 0 or +∞) at all times. In particular, we assume that for each
24Throughout this extension and the next one, the superscripts j ∈ {1, . . . , J} designate the sources and
not exponents.
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j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, the process (bjt)t is a predictable process with values in R+ ∪ {+∞}.
If at time t the nth auction associated with the source j occurs, the outcome of this auction
is the following:
• If bjt > p
j
n, then the ad trader wins the auction: he pays the price p
j
n and his banner
is displayed.
• If bjt ≤ p
j
n, then another trader wins the auction.
Like in the model with only one source, we assume that, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, (pjn)n∈N∗
are i.i.d. random variables distributed according to an absolutely continuous distribution.
We denote by F j the cumulative distribution function and by f j the probability density
function associated with the source j. As above, we assume, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, that:
• ∀n ∈ N∗, pjn is almost surely positive. In particular, F j(0) = 0.
• ∀p > 0, f j(p) > 0.
• limp→+∞ p
3f j(p) = 0.
We also assume that the random variables (pjn)j∈{1,...,J},n∈N∗ are all independent.
Remaining cash process:
As above, we denote by (St)t the process modeling the amount of cash to be spent. Its
dynamics is:
dSt = −
J∑
j=1
p
j
N
j
t
1
{bjt>p
j
N
j
t
}
dN
j
t , S0 = S¯.
Inventory processes:
For each j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, the number of impressions associated with the auction requests
coming for the source j is modeled by an inventory process (Ijt )t. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , J},
the dynamics of (Ijt )t is:
dI
j
t = 1{bjt>p
j
N
j
t
}
dN
j
t , I
j
0 = 0.
To simplify exposition, we write It = (I
1
t , . . . , I
J
t ) ∈ N
J , and we write the dynamics of the
process (It)t:
dIt =
J∑
j=1
1
{bjt>p
j
N
j
t
}
dN
j
t e
j,
where (e1, . . . , eJ ) is the canonical basis of RJ .
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Stochastic optimal control problem:
In this first extension of the model, the trader aims at maximizing the expected value of an
indicator of the form
α1I1T + . . . + α
JIJT , α
1, . . . , αJ ≥ 0.
As in Section 2, we consider a relaxed problem with a penalty for extra-spending:
inf
(b1t ,...,b
J
t )t∈A
J
E
− J∑
j=1
αjI
j
T +Kmin (ST , 0)
2
 .
3.1.2 HJB equations: from dimension J + 2 to dimension 2
The value function associated with this problem is:
u : (t, I, S) ∈ [0, T ]×NJ×(−∞, S¯] 7→ inf
(b1s ,...,b
J
s )s≥t∈A
J
t
E
− J∑
j=1
αjI
j
T
b,t,Ij
+Kmin
(
S
b,t,S
T , 0
)2 ,
where
dSb,t,Ss = −
J∑
j=1
p
j
N
j
s
1
{bjs>p
j
N
j
s
}
dN js , S
b,t,S
t = S,
dIjs
b,t,Ij
= 1
{bjs>p
j
N
j
s
}
dN js , I
j
t
b,t,Ij
= Ij , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}.
The associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is:
− ∂tu(t, I, S)−
J∑
j=1
λj inf
bj∈R+
∫ bj
0
f j(p)(u(t, I + ej , S − p)− u(t, I, S))dp = 0, (3.1)
with terminal condition u(T, I1, . . . , IJ , S) = −
∑J
j=1 α
jIj +Kmin (S, 0)2.
Eq. (3.1) is a non-standard integro-differential HJB equation in dimension J + 2 which
generalizes Eq. (2.2). As in the case with only one source, we can consider an ansatz of the
form
u(t, I1, . . . , IJ , S) = −
J∑
j=1
αjIj + v(t, S).
With this ansatz, Eq. (3.1) becomes indeed:
− ∂tv(t, S)−
J∑
j=1
λj inf
bj∈R+
∫ bj
0
f j(p)(v(t, S − p)− v(t, S)− αj)dp = 0, (3.2)
with terminal condition v(T, S) = Kmin (S, 0)2.
Eq. (3.2) is another HJB equation, but in dimension 2, which generalize Eq. (2.3).
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3.1.3 Fluid limit approximation
As in the model with only one source, one could numerically approximate the solution to
Eq. (3.2) and subsequently find the optimal bidding strategy. However, it is interesting to
consider the approximation arising from the replacement of the term v(t, S − p)− v(t, S) in
Eq. (3.2) by its first-order Taylor expansion −p∂Sv(t, S). We therefore replace Eq. (3.2)
by:
− ∂tv(t, S)−
J∑
j=1
λj inf
bj∈R+
−
∫ bj
0
f j(p)(αj + p∂Sv(t, S))dp = 0, (3.3)
with terminal condition v(T, S) = Kmin (S, 0)2.
Eq. (3.3) is related to the fluid limit of the above stochastic optimal control problem which
is defined by:
inf
(b˜1t ,...,b˜
J
t )t∈A
J
det
−
J∑
j=1
λjαj
∫ T
0
F j(b˜jt )dt+Kmin
(
S˜ b˜T , 0
)2
,
where
dS˜ b˜t = −
J∑
j=1
λjGj(b˜jt )dt, G
j : x ∈ R+ ∪ {+∞} 7→
∫ x
0
pf j(p)dp.
The value function v˜ associated with this problem is:
v˜(t, S) = inf
(b˜1s ,...,b˜
J
s )s≥t∈Adet
−
J∑
j=1
λjαj
∫ T
t
F j(b˜js)ds+Kmin
(
S˜
b˜,t,S
T , 0
)2
,
where
dS˜ b˜,t,Ss = −
J∑
j=1
λjGj(b˜js)ds, S˜
b˜,t,S
t = S.
Using the same techniques as for Theorem 2.1, we can prove the following Theorem:
Theorem 3.1. Let us define
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, Hj(x) = λj sup
bj∈R+
∫ bj
0
f j(p)
(
αj + xp
)
dp,
and
H = H1 + . . . +HJ .
The value function v˜ is given by:
v˜(t, S) = sup
x≤0
(
Sx− (T − t)H(x)−
x2
4K
)
.
It is the unique weak semi-concave solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (3.3).
Furthermore, the optimal control function (t, S) 7→ b˜∗(t, S) is given by the following:
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• If S ≥
∑J
j=1 λ
j(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp, then:
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, b˜j∗(t, S) = +∞.
• If S <
∑J
j=1 λ
j(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp, then:
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, b˜j∗(t, S) = −
αj
x∗
,
where x∗ is characterized by
S = (T − t)H ′(x∗) +
x∗
2K
. (3.4)
Proof.
By using the change of variables ajs = λjGj(b˜
j
s) ∈ Ij = [0, λj
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp], we have:
v˜(t, S) = inf
(a1s ,...,a
J
s )s≥t∈A
′
det,I1,...,IJ
∫ T
t
J∑
j=1
Lj
(
ajs
)
ds+Kmin
(
Ŝ
a,t,S
T , 0
)2
, (3.5)
where A′
det,I1,...,IJ
is the set of F0-measurable processes with values in I
1× . . .×IJ , where
dŜa,t,Ss = −
(
a1s + . . .+ a
J
s
)
ds, Ŝ
a,t,S
t = S,
and where, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, the function Lj is defined by:
Lj : aj ∈ Ij 7→ −λjαjF j
(
Gj
−1
(
aj
λj
))
.
An equivalent way to write Eq. (3.5) is:
v˜(t, S) = inf
(as)s≥t∈A
′′
det
∫ T
t
L(as)ds+Kmin
(
Sˇ
a,t,S
T , 0
)2
, (3.6)
where A′′
det
is the set of F0-measurable processes with values in I = [0,
∑J
j=1 λ
j
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp],
where
dSˇa,t,Ss = −asds, Sˇ
a,t,S
t = S,
and where
L : a ∈ I 7→ inf
(a1,...,aJ )∈I1×...×IJ ,a1+...+aJ=a
J∑
j=1
Lj
(
aj
)
.
As in the proof of Theorem 2.1, Lj is a convex function, continuously differentiable on the
interior of Ij.
Let us now compute the Legendre-Fenchel transform of Lj:
Lj
∗
(x) = sup
aj∈Ij
xaj − Lj(aj)
= sup
bj∈R+
λjxGj(bj) + λjαjF j(bj)
= λj sup
bj∈R+
∫ bj
0
(αj + xp)f j(p)dp (3.7)
= Hj(x).
As in the proof of Theorem 2.1, we can easily find the supremum in Eq. (3.7):
23
• If x < 0, then bj∗ = −α
j
x
, and
Hj(x) = λj
∫ −αj
x
0
(αj + xp)f j(p)dp
= −λjx
∫ −αj
x
0
F j(p)dp.
• If x is nonnegative, then bj∗ = +∞, and
Hj(x) = λj
(
αj + x
∫ ∞
0
pf j(p)dp
)
.
In particular, Hj is a C2 function.
By using an infimal convolution, the function L is convex, and its Legendre transform is
H = H1 + . . .+HJ .
From Eq. (3.6), v˜ is given by the Hopf-Lax formula:
v˜(t, S) = inf
y∈[S−
∑J
j=1 λ
j
∫∞
0
pfj(p)dp(T−t),S]
(
(T − t)L
(
S − y
T − t
)
+Kmin(y, 0)2
)
.
Equivalently, by infimal convolution, we have:
v˜(t, S) = sup
x
(
Sx− (T − t)H(x)− sup
y
(
yx−Kmin(y, 0)2
))
= sup
x≤0
(
Sx− (T − t)H(x)−
x2
4K
)
. (3.8)
This is the first result of the Theorem.
Furthermore, we know that v˜ is the unique weak semi-concave solution of the following
Hamilton-Jacobi equation:
−∂tv˜(t, S) +H(∂S v˜(t, S)) = 0,
with terminal condition v˜(T, S) = Kmin(S, 0)2.
This equation is exactly the same as Eq. (3.3), hence the second assertion of the Theorem.
Moreover the optimal control in the modified problem (3.6) is given by a∗(t, S) = H ′(∂S v˜(t, S)).
Therefore, by classical results on infimal convolutions, the optimal controls in the modified
problem (3.5) are given by:
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, aj∗(t, S) = Hj
′
(∂S v˜(t, S)).
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We conclude that the optimal control function in the initial problem is:
b˜j∗(t, S) =
{
− α
j
∂S v˜(t,S)
, ∂S v˜(t, S) < 0
+∞, ∂S v˜(t, S) ≥ 0.
If S ≥ (T − t)H ′(0) =
∑J
j=1 λ
j(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp, then the supremum in Eq. (3.8) is
reached at x∗ = 0. Therefore, ∂S v˜(t, S) = 0 and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, b˜
j∗(t, S) = +∞.
Otherwise, the supremum in Eq. (3.8) is reached at x∗ ≤ 0 uniquely characterized by:
S = (T − t)H ′(x∗) +
x∗
2K
.
In particular, ∂S v˜(t, S) = x
∗ and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, b˜j∗(t, S) = −α
j
x∗
where x∗ is characterized
by Eq. (3.4).
Following the same reasoning as in Section 2, we approximate the optimal bids b1∗t , . . . , b
J∗
t
at time t by using the optimal bids in the fluid-limit approximation and in the limit case
K → +∞. In other words, we approximate the optimal bids b1∗t , . . . , b
J∗
t at time t by
b˜1∗∞(t, St−), . . . , b˜
J∗
∞ (t, St−), where the functions (b˜
j∗
∞)j are defined by:
• If S ≥
∑J
j=1 λ
j(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp, then:
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, b˜j∗∞(t, S) = +∞.
• If S <
∑J
j=1 λ
j(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp, then:
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, b˜j∗∞(t, S) = −
αj
H ′−1
(
S
T−t
) . (3.9)
This approximation of the optimal bidding strategy deserves several remarks.
First, the analysis for the case St− ≥
∑J
j=1 λ
j(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp is the same as in the
one-source case. The value
∑J
j=1 λ
j(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp represents the expected amount
that will be spent between time t and time T if the ad trader wins all the auctions he
participates in. Therefore, it is natural to send a very high bid to be sure to win all the
auctions if the amount to spend St− is greater than that value.
Second, if St− <
∑J
j=1 λ
j(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp, then we see from Eq. (3.9) that the bids
differ from one source to the other according to the weights (αj)j :
∀j, j′ ∈ {1, . . . , J},
b˜
j∗
∞(t, S)
αj
=
b˜
j′∗
∞ (t, S)
αj
′ .
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In particular, the bids should be the same across sources at a given point in time if one is
only interested in the total number of impressions, i.e. if α1 = . . . = αJ .
In the case St− <
∑J
j=1 λ
j(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp, it is also interesting to notice that Eq. (3.9)
implies that
∀t ∈ [0, T ],
J∑
j=1
λj(T − t)
∫ b˜j∗∞(t,St−)
0
pf j(p)dp = St−.
If we use the above approximation of the optimal bidding strategy, the dynamics of the
remaining cash is (for 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T ):
dSs = −
J∑
j=1
p
j
N
j
s
1
{bj∗∞(s,Ss−)>p
j
N
j
s
}
dN js , St = S.
Therefore:
dE[Ss] = −E
 J∑
j=1
λj
∫ b˜j∗∞(s,Ss−)
0
pf j(p)dpds
 = −E[Ss]
T − s
ds.
This gives E[Ss] = S
T−s
T−t . As in the one-source case, the approximation of the optimal
bidding strategy is such that, on average, the remaining cash is spent evenly across [t, T ].
3.2 What about conversions?
So far, we have only considered problems where the KPI maximized by the ad trader was
linked to the number of impressions he purchases. Practitioners are interested in other KPIs
than the number of impressions (related to the CPM). In particular, the number of clicks, or
the number of acquisitions of a product (following a click on a banner) are very important in-
dicators of the success of a campaign – the KPIs used in practice are the CPC and the CPA.
In what follows, we consider a model where two variables are optimized upon: the number
of impressions, and the number of conversions (which can be regarded as clicks or acquisi-
tions, depending on the considered applications). In fact, we generalize the previous model
by considering more general marked Poisson processes, where the marks are not limited to
the prices to beat, but also model the occurrence of a conversion with a random variable
following a Bernoulli distribution (the parameter of this Bernoulli distribution is known as
the conversion rate, i.e. the probability to turn an impression into a conversion).
3.2.1 Setup of the model
As above, we still consider an ad trader who wishes to spend a given amount of money S¯
over a time window [0, T ].
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Auctions:
This ad trader is connected to J > 1 sources from which he receives requests to participate
in auctions in order to purchase inventory – we assume that the trader knows from which
source each auction request arises. Requests are modeled with J marked Poisson processes:
the arrival of requests from the source j ∈ {1, . . . , J} is triggered by the jumps of the Poisson
process (N jt )t with intensity λ
j > 0, and the marks (pjn)n∈N∗ and (ξ
j
n)n∈N∗ correspond, for
each auction request sent by the source j, respectively to the highest bid sent by the other
participants, and to the occurrence of a conversion – ξjn ∈ {0, 1} only makes sense if the
auction is won by the ad trader.
Every time he receives from the source j a request to participate in an auction, the ad trader
can bid a price: at time t, if he receives a request from the source j, then we denote his bid
by bjt . As in the above model, we assume that for each j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, the process (b
j
t )t is a
predictable process with values in R+ ∪ {+∞}.
If at time t the nth auction associated with the source j occurs, the outcome of this auction
is the following:
• If bjt > p
j
n, then the ad trader wins the auction: he pays the price p
j
n and his banner
is displayed. Moreover, a conversion occurs if and only if ξjn = 1.
• If bjt ≤ p
j
n, then another trader wins the auction.
As above, we assume that for each j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, (pjn)n∈N∗ are i.i.d. random variables
distributed according to an absolutely continuous distribution. We denote by F j the cumu-
lative distribution function and by f j the probability density function associated with the
source j. As above, we assume, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, that:
• ∀n ∈ N∗, pjn is almost surely positive. In particular, F j(0) = 0.
• ∀p > 0, f j(p) > 0.
• limp→+∞ p
3f j(p) = 0.
We also assume that the random variables (pjn)j∈{1,...,J},n∈N∗ are all independent.
As far as the variables (ξjn)j∈{1,...,J},n∈N∗ are concerned, we assume that they are all inde-
pendent and independent from the variables (pjn)j∈{1,...,J},n∈N∗. Moreover, we assume that
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, (ξjn)n∈N∗ are i.i.d. random variables distributed according to a
Bernoulli distribution with parameter νj ∈ [0, 1].
Remaining cash process:
As above, we denote by (St)t the process modeling the amount of cash to be spent. Its
dynamics is:
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dSt = −
J∑
j=1
p
j
N
j
t
1
{bjt>p
j
N
j
t
}
dN
j
t , S0 = S¯.
Inventory processes:
For each j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, the number of impressions associated with the auction requests
coming for the source j is modeled by an inventory process (Ijt )t. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , J},
the dynamics of (Ijt )t is:
dI
j
t = 1{bjt>p
j
N
j
t
}
dN
j
t , I
j
0 = 0.
Processes for the number of conversions:
For each j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, the number of conversions associated with the auction requests
coming for the source j is modeled by a new process (Cjt )t. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, the
dynamics of (Cjt )t is:
dC
j
t = ξ
j
N
j
t
1
{bjt>p
j
N
j
t
}
dN
j
t , C
j
0 = 0.
Stochastic optimal control problem:
In this second extension of the model, the trader aims at maximizing the expected value of
an indicator of the form(
α1I1T + . . . + α
JIJT
)
+
(
δ1C1T + . . .+ δ
JCJT
)
, α1, . . . , αJ ≥ 0, δ1, . . . , δJ ≥ 0.
The relaxed problem we consider is:
inf
(b1t ,...,b
J
t )t∈A
J
E
− J∑
j=1
αjI
j
T −
J∑
j=1
δjC
j
T +Kmin (ST , 0)
2
 .
3.2.2 HJB equations: from dimension 2J + 2 to dimension 2
The value function associated with this problem is:
u : (t, I, C, S) ∈ [0, T ]× NJ × NJ × (−∞, S¯]
7→ inf
(b1s ,...,b
J
s )s≥t∈A
J
t
E
− J∑
j=1
αjI
j
T
b,t,Ij
−
J∑
j=1
δjC
j
T
b,t,Cj
+Kmin
(
S
b,t,S
T , 0
)2 ,
where
dSb,t,Ss = −
J∑
j=1
p
j
N
j
s
1
{bjs>p
j
N
j
s
}
dN js , S
b,t,S
t = S,
dIjs
b,t,Ij
= 1
{bjs>p
j
N
j
s
}
dN js , I
j
t
b,t,Ij
= Ij , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J},
and
dCjs
b,t,Cj
= ξj
N
j
s
1
{bjs>p
j
N
j
s
}
dN js , C
j
t
b,t,Cj
= Cj, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}.
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In particular, there are J new state variables corresponding to the number of conversions
associated with each of the J sources.
The associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is:
−∂tu(t, I, C, S) −
J∑
j=1
λj inf
bj∈R+
∫ bj
0
f j(p)
[
(1− νj)(u(t, I + ej , C, S − p)− u(t, I, C, S))
+νj(u(t, I + ej , C + ej , S − p)− u(t, I, C, S))
]
dp = 0, (3.10)
with terminal condition
u(T, I1, . . . , IJ , C1, . . . , CJ , S) = −
J∑
j=1
αjIj −
J∑
j=1
δjCj +Kmin (S, 0)2 .
Eq. (3.10) is a non-standard integro-differential HJB equation in dimension 2J + 2 which
generalizes Eq. (3.1). In this extension, we consider an ansatz of the form
u(t, I1, . . . , IJ , C1, . . . , CJ , S) = −
J∑
j=1
αjIj −
J∑
j=1
δjCj + v(t, S).
With this ansatz, Eq. (3.10) becomes another HJB equation, but in dimension 2, which
generalizes Eq. (3.2) to the case where conversions are taken into account:
− ∂tv(t, S)−
J∑
j=1
λj inf
bj∈R+
∫ bj
0
f j(p)(v(t, S − p)− v(t, S)− αj − νjδj)dp = 0, (3.11)
with terminal condition v(T, S) = Kmin (S, 0)2.
3.2.3 Fluid limit approximation
Eq. (3.11) is the same as Eq. (3.2), except that αj is replaced by αj + νjδj . In particular
we can use similar rules as in the previous extension to approximate the optimal bidding
strategy.
We introduce the function H defined by:
H : x ∈ R 7→ H(x) =
J∑
j=1
λj sup
bj∈R+
∫ bj
0
f j(p)
(
αj + νjδj + xp
)
dp
=
 ∑Jj=1−λjx
∫ −αj+νjδj
x
0 F
j(p)dp, x < 0∑J
j=1 λ
j
(
αj + νjδj + x
∫∞
0 pf(p)dp
)
, x ≥ 0.
In the case of conversions, we approximate the optimal bids b1∗t , . . . , b
J∗
t at time t by
b˜1∗∞(t, St−), . . . , b˜
J∗
∞ (t, St−), where the functions (b˜
j∗
∞)j are defined by:
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• If S ≥
∑J
j=1 λ
j(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp, then:
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, b˜j∗∞(t, S) = +∞.
• If S <
∑J
j=1 λ
j(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp, then:
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, b˜j∗∞(t, S) = −
αj + νjδj
H ′−1
(
S
T−t
) .
As in the previous extension of the model, if St− ≥
∑J
j=1 λ
j(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp, then it is
natural to send a very high bid to be sure to win all the auctions.
If St− <
∑J
j=1 λ
j(T − t)
∫∞
0 pf
j(p)dp, then the bids differ from one source to the other
according to the following rule:
∀j, j′ ∈ {1, . . . , J},
b˜
j∗
∞(t, S)
αj + νjδj
=
b˜
j′∗
∞ (t, S)
αj
′ + νj′δj′
.
In particular, if the ad trader only cares about the total number of conversions, i.e. if
α1 = . . . = αJ = 0 and δ1 = . . . = δJ = 1, then the bids are the same across sources, up to
a multiplicative factor which corresponds to the probability of conversion associated with
each source.
Finally, in this extension as in the previous one, if one uses the fluid-limit approximation,
then, the budget is expected to be spent evenly.
3.3 Discussion about the models
We have presented a first model in Section 2 and two extensions of that first model earlier
in this section. In the following paragraphs, we aim at challenging the assumptions under-
lying these models. In particular, we discuss the specificities associated with second-price
auctions, and the existence of floor prices, which goes against the assumptions on the distri-
bution of the price to beat in the models presented above. We also discuss nonlinear KPIs
for which there is no dimensionality reduction.
3.3.1 First-price auctions vs. second-price auctions
In both the initial model of Section 2 and the two extensions presented in this section, we
considered Vickrey auctions. In other words, the price paid by the ad trader when he wins
the auction is not the price he has bid (the first price), but a lower price corresponding to
the highest bid that has been proposed by other participants (the second price). In the case
of first-price auctions, the dynamics of the remaining budget (in the single-source model of
Section 2) is not anymore given by Eq. (2.1), but instead by:
dSt = −bt1{bt>pNt}dNt, S0 = S¯.
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If we consider the same objective function as in Section 2, then the new value function
u : (t, I, S) ∈ [0, T ]× N× (−∞, S¯] 7→ inf
(bs)s≥t∈At
E
[
−Ib,t,IT +Kmin
(
S
b,t,S
T , 0
)2]
,
where
dSb,t,Ss = −bs1{bs>pNs}dNs, S
b,t,S
t = S,
and
dIb,t,Is = 1{bs>pNs}dNs, I
b,t,I
t = I,
is associated with the following HJB equation:
−∂tu(t, I, S) − λ inf
b∈R+
F (b)(u(t, I + 1, S − b)− u(t, I, S)) = 0,
with terminal condition u(T, I, S) = −I +Kmin (S, 0)2.
With the ansatz u(t, I, S) = −I + v(t, S), this equation becomes:
− ∂tv(t, S)− λ inf
b∈R+
F (b)(v(t, S − b)− v(t, S) − 1) = 0, (3.12)
with terminal condition v(T, S) = Kmin (S, 0)2.
Eq. (3.12) replaces Eq. (2.3). In particular, the first order condition is not anymore
v(t, S − b)− v(t, S) − 1 = 0,
but instead
v(t, S − b)− v(t, S)− 1 =
F (b)
f(b)
∂Sv(t, S − b).
In particular, because v is nonincreasing with respect to S, the optimal bid should always
be lower in the case of first-price auctions than in the case of second-price auctions.
It is also noteworthy that a fluid-limit approximation can be considered in the case of
Eq. (3.12) by solving
− ∂tv˜(t, S) + λ sup
b∈R+
(F (b)b∂S v˜(t, S) + F (b)) = 0, (3.13)
with terminal condition v˜(T, S) = Kmin (S, 0)2.
In particular, Eq. (3.13) is a first-order Hamilton-Jacobi equation, and by using the same
techniques as in the case of second-price auctions, one also finds that the optimal strategy
consists of spending the remaining budget evenly.
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3.3.2 Floor prices
In order to improve performances, publishers can set floor prices which sometimes modify
the underlying nature of the auction. Floor prices come indeed in two flavors:
• Hard floors (or reserve prices): the bid of the ad trader is only taken into account if
it is higher than the floor price level φ set by the publisher (the supply side). When a
hard floor level φ is set, everything works as if a “ghost player” was always bidding φ.
In particular, the cumulative distribution function F may be discontinuous, with a
jump at price φ.25
• Soft floors: if the best bid is below the soft floor level φ, then the winner pays its own
bid, and not the second price; otherwise, the price paid is the maximum between the
second price and φ. In other words, the auction is no more of the Vickrey type: it
is a second-price auction with a hard floor for large bids and it becomes a first-price
auction for small bids.
Our model can be generalized to tackle the case of hard floors by generalizing our approach
to the case of a discontinuous cumulative distribution function F – in that case f can
be regarded as a distribution. The result is still that the budget should be spent evenly,
but the optimal bidding strategy is more cumbersome to write – and the exact expression
has no theoretical interest. The case of soft floors can also be addressed, but it is really
cumbersome. In particular, in the case of a uniform soft floor φ for all the auctions, Eq. (2.3)
is replaced by an equation of the form
−∂tv(t, S)− λ inf
{
inf
b∈[0,φ]
F (b)(v(t, S − b)− v(t, S)− 1),
inf
b>φ
∫ b
0
f(p)(v(t, S −max(p, φ)) − v(t, S)− 1)dp
}
= 0,
with terminal condition v(T, S) = Kmin (S, 0)2.
In practice, it is also noteworthy that our bid may impact the strategic behavior of other
users and in particular the behavior of the publishers who may set dynamic floor prices.
From a modeling point of view, it means that the function f is impacted by the strategy
itself, and it opens a vast field where (mean-field) game theory could be very useful.
3.3.3 Nonlinear KPIs
It is customary in the advertising industry to work with different metrics or KPIs. Practi-
tioners usually aim indeed at minimizing the CPM, the CPC (cost per click) or the CPA
(cost per acquisition).
25It is noteworthy that different publishers may set different hard floors. In other words, there may be
several jumps in F .
32
With the notations of our model, the CPM at time T is naturally defined by:
CPMT =
S¯ − ST
IT
.
If the total spending is imposed to be S¯, minimizing the expected value of CPMT boils down
to minimizing E
[
1
IT
]
, and not maximizing E[IT ] – or, equivalently, minimizing E[−IT ], as
in the model of Section 2.
It is noteworthy that our model somehow ignores the risk-aversion effect induced by the
nonlinearity of traditional KPIs, but this is only a side-effect of convexity, as nonlinear
KPIs have not been built to capture any form of risk aversion. In fact, the real issue is that
the change of variables (from u to v) at the heart of the dimensionality reduction used in
our model does not extend to nonlinear KPIs. Nevertheless, from a mathematical perspec-
tive, our approach based on the dynamic programming principle (and HJB equations (2.2))
remains valid for any KPI.26
The above analysis for the CPM is also valid in the case of the CPC and the CPA. In the
extension of the model involving conversions – which may be regarded as clicks or acquisi-
tions – we considered a linear function of the number of conversions
∑J
j=1 δ
jC
j
T , whereas
practitioners would rather consider nonlinear KPIs related to the average amount paid to
obtain the different types of conversion.
Overall, we think that linear KPIs are as relevant as the traditional nonlinear ones currently
used by marketers (when the total budget is fixed), and that linear KPIs should be preferred,
from a mathematical perspective, for solving the problems faced by ad trading desks.
Conclusion
In this research paper, we have addressed several problems faced by media trading desks
buying ad inventory through real-time auctions. These problems are new for the community
of applied mathematicians, as the industry of programmatic advertising is itself quite re-
cent. However, many ideas coming from the works of applied mathematicians on algorithmic
trading in quantitative finance are inspiring for developing new models and subsequently
lighting the way to innovation in a new and fast-growing field which is in demand for math-
ematical methods (as Finance was 25 years ago).
Our contribution is multifold. First of all, from a modeling perspective, we model auctions
arriving at random times by marked Poisson processes, where the jumps of the Poisson pro-
cesses stand for the occurrence of auction requests and the marks for several variables such
as the best bid proposed by other participants, and the occurrence of a conversion. This
approach makes it possible to use the dynamic programming principle and derive a sim-
ple characterization of the optimal bidding strategy – through a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
26The KPI only impacts the terminal condition on u.
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equation. Furthermore, it allows to consider multiple sources and types of inventory in a
very simple way.
Secondly, by considering linear objective criterions (or KPIs), we manage to reduce the di-
mensionality of the problem. In particular, whatever the initial number of inventory sources
and types, and whether or not we consider conversions, we show that the problem always
boils down to solving a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDE in dimension 2 (one time dimension
and one spatial dimension).
Thirdly, by considering a fluid-limit approximation of the problem, we obtain almost-closed-
form solutions for the optimal bidding strategy. Moreover, the results in the fluid-limit
approximation allow to characterize the optimal strategy not only in terms of the optimal
bids, but in terms of an optimal scheduling for the budget that remains to be spent. The
latter simplifies the implementation, as the optimal bidding strategy can be dynamically
approximated by a feedback-control tracking mechanism.
Eventually, the modeling approach we have proposed in this article opens the door to future
research where the optimal control of the bidding strategy is coupled with on-line learning
(treated in a companion article – see [12]), where the different participants in the auctions
– including the publisher – could adopt strategic behaviors, where the information about
the outcomes of auctions is subject to an important latency, etc.
Appendix: A simple model in discrete time
In this appendix, we present a simplified and discrete-time version of the model introduced
in Section 2 for providing the readers – especially those who are not used with continuous-
time models – with intuition about the optimization approach used throughout the paper.
Let us introduce a probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with a discrete filtration (Fn)n∈N
satisfying the usual conditions. The variables we define in this subsection are considered
over this filtered probability space.
Let us consider a bidding system participating in a sequence of N Vickrey auctions. We
assume that the state of the system is described by three variables: (i) the number n of
auction requests received by the ad trading desk, (ii) the number In of impressions pur-
chased after the nth auction (we assume that I0 = 0), and (iii) the remaining budget Sn
after the nth auction – we assume that S0 = S¯ is the maximal total amount to be spent.
The goal of the algorithm is to maximize an objective function of the form E [g(N, IN , SN )],
for some function g. In particular, g(N, IN , SN ) can be equal to IN if we want to maximize
the number of impressions.
For each auction request, the algorithm chooses a bid level. For the nth auction, we denote
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here by bn the bid sent to the auction server (bn has to be Fn−1-measurable). When the
nth auction occurs, a random variable pn is drawn with the probability density function f .
This random variable represents the price to beat.
The resulting dynamics of the system is the following:
• If bn > pn, then the algorithm wins the auction, the price paid is pn, and the system
evolves from the state (n− 1, I, S) to the state (n, I + 1, S − pn).
• If bn ≤ pn, then the algorithm does not win the auction and the system evolves from
the state (n− 1, I, S) to the state (n, I, S).
Let us define the value function:
u(n, I, S) = max
(bk)k>n∈An
E [g(N, IN , SN )|Fn] ,
where (bk)k>n ∈ An if and only if (bk)k>n is a predictable process such that SN ≥ 0, almost
surely.
In order to solve this optimization problem, we simply use the dynamic programming prin-
ciple which yields the following Bellman equation:
u(n− 1, I, S) = max
bn∈[0,S]
E [u(n, I + 1, S − pn)1bn>pn + u(n, I, S)1bn≤pn ] . (A.1)
Eq. (A.1) can also be written as the following difference equation
u(n, I, S)− u(n− 1, I, S) + max
bn∈[0,S]
E [(u(n, I + 1, S − pn)− u(n, I, S))1bn>pn ] = 0,
i.e.:
u(n, I, S)− u(n− 1, I, S) + max
bn∈[0,S]
∫ bn
0
(u(n, I +1, S − p)− u(n, I, S))f(p)dp = 0. (A.2)
From the terminal condition u(N, I, S) = g(N, I, S), the value function u can easily be
approximated numerically by backward induction on a grid.
The optimal bid for the nth auction is given by the optimality condition
u(n, In−1 + 1, Sn−1 − b
∗
n) = u(n, In−1, Sn−1)
or by b∗n = Sn−1 if u(n, In−1+1, 0) > u(n, In−1, Sn−1). In particular, when the constraint is
not binding, the optimal bid is consistent with the fact that, in the case of Vickrey auctions,
participants have the incentive to bid their true valuation for the item.
It is noteworthy that a similar change of variables as in the continuous-time model of
Section 2 can be used in the special case where g(N, I, S) = I. In that case, if we write
u(n, I, S) = I + v(n, S), then the Bellman equation (A.2) can be simplified into:
v(n, S)− v(n − 1, S) + max
bn∈[0,S]
∫ bn
0
(v(n, S − p)− v(n, S) + 1)f(p)dp = 0,
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and the terminal condition is v(N,S) = 0.
This model in discrete-time is useful to understand the general modeling framework we use,
but it is limited. First, in practice, auctions arrive at random times and we do not know
in advance how many auction requests the algorithm will receive. Moreover, for problems
where different sources of auction requests have to be treated in parallel, the above discrete
modeling approach is not convenient. Continuous-time models, where the (random) occur-
rence of auction requests are modeled by the jumps of a Poisson process, are definitely more
realistic and flexible.
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